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Judith
Coney
Massimo Introvigne has argued in favour of the term
'religious minorities' being applied to contemporary religious groups
presently labelled as 'new religious movements' by scholars. It
is not entirely clear from his article whether he is urging this
course of action on his fellow academics, or onto the authorities
responsible for determining policies in Europe. Perhaps by encouraging
the first group to do so he is optimistic that others will take
up the new term. I would like to sum up the reasons why using a
new term may be desirable, but also draw attention to a few of the
difficulties which may lie ahead if the term 'religious minorities'
is adopted generally by academics.
I will spend little time in pointing out the advantages, since
recently there has been considerable debate in both this journal
and others on the issue. In short, however, it is generally conceded,
as Massimo Introvigne has indicated in his paper, that the terms
that are in current use, 'sect', 'cult' and 'new religious movement'
are all problematic. 'Sect' and 'cult', formerly sociological terms
with technical meanings, have both been appropriated for political
ends by the 'anti-cult' movement in Europe and elsewhere. Although
some of my colleagues, notably Dr Michael York at Bath Spa University
College, have advocated re-appropriating these terms, the general
feeling is that the battle has been lost. For this reason, most
well-intentioned scholars use the term 'new religious movement'.
However, this too, has its difficulties. Firstly, as Massimo Introvigne
states, it has taken on many of the negative associations of the
other two terms. Secondly, many members of groups put into this
category do not recognise themselves when it is used about them.
Some, such as ISKCON devotees, do not consider themselves as 'new'.
Others, such as followers of Sathya Sai Baba, and the Brahma Kumaris,
describe themselves as 'spiritual' rather than 'religious'. Thirdly,
it is unclear at what point a 'new religious movement' becomes an
'old religious movement'. Is it when the founder dies? Or when records
start to be kept? Or when a second and third generation is established,
and controversy is a thing of the past? Or when new 'new religious
movements' begin to appear?
Most academics, therefore, are receptive to any new suggestions
to get us out of this quandary. However, it is right that we should
consider these carefully, making sure that we do not jump from the
frying pan into the fire. Taking on the role of devil's advocate
for a moment, let me start by querying Massimo Introvigne's argument
that the term 'religious minority' is the most neutral term available.
Somewhat pedantically, perhaps, I would put it to him that words
are rarely, if ever, neutral commodities. 'Religious minority' sends
out its own loaded message into the public arena. However, I would
agree that at present, in Europe, its associations are not those
of 'brainwashing', exploitation and abuse, and that in this sense
its message is applicable to contemporary movements and is one which
academics can support. We should not forget, though, that some groups
now labelled as 'religious minorities' in Europe, especially Islamic
communities, still experience themselves as threatened, marginalised
and vulnerable. Thus, being called a 'religious minority' may not
necessarily place those previously labelled as 'sects', 'cults'
and 'new religious movements' in a more comfortable position in
relation to the mainstream.
I would point to a further possible drawback. This is, that since
the meanings of terms are never definitively fixed, pejorative connotations
may be taken from the term 'new religious movement' and applied
to 'religious minority'. This occurred in the past between the terms
'sect', 'cult' and 'new religious movement'; it may be that the
terms 'religious minority' and 'new religious movement' will increasingly
be used interchangeably. In this sense, we will be back to where
we started. Arguably, however, we will not even be in the same situation
as before, as more groups than those under attack today will have
been added to the hit list for anti-cult groups. This is not simply
a hypothetical future, given the rise of intolerance towards racial,
ethnic and religious minorities in Europe today. Thus, we should
think through the potential consequences for all these different
communities very seriously before deciding on what our policy should
be.
Two other problems that are evident now will be seen by some to
be of less significance, since neither really have repercussions
in the wider public arena. Arguably, however, both are of importance
to their respective constituencies, and should be included in the
debate. The first is that the term 'religious minority' may be felt
to be no more representative to members of some contemporary groups
than the term 'new religious movement'. As far as ISKCON devotees
are concerned, the term has the advantage of not including the word
'new'. For them, therefore, it seems more accurate. However, for
those groups who think of themselves as 'spiritual' rather than
'religious', or even neither, replacing the old label with that
of 'religious minority' does not seem to take them very far forward.
Indeed, they may not recognise themselves at all in the new term,
as they may not experience themselves as a 'minority', despite having
a comparatively small membership.
The second is that, for sociologists of religion such as Dr Introvigne
and Professor Eileen Barker who coined the term 'new religious movement',
the argument can be made that this term does actually have
its uses. I am happy to agree that many groups defined in this way,
such as ISKCON, have their roots in older traditions. From this
perspective, the term 'new' does not apply. However, some other
contemporary movements, also the butts of undeserved hostility,
do represent themselves as new. Indeed, it is this newness
which allows them to offer new hope to humanity. Moreover, sociologically
speaking, ISKCON can be seen in some respects to be new in the early
years after Prabhupada's arrival in the USA. It certainly seemed
new to most Westerners in the late 1960s, and it initially attracted
converts in the West who at the time had no experience or formal
understanding of the Vaishnavite tradition. Early ashram
life, furthermore, seems to have had many of the characteristics
which sociologists associate with new religion, such as common ownership,
relationships based on personal trust rather than on institutional
regulation, and a high turnover of members.
Of course, I can see the reasons why devotees dislike the label
'new religious movement' today. These include the fact that it places
them in a category with groups with which they feel they have nothing
in common, leaves them exposed to unjustified accusations of 'brainwashing';
it does not reflect ISKCON's support by the Gujarati community as
an exemplar of a major South Asian tradition and it does not resonate
with the deep understanding of Vaishnavism now evinced by many devotees.
Nevertheless, these considerations are, a sociologist might argue,
because we are thirty years on, rather than because ISKCON has never
been new in any sense whatsoever. But I should emphasise that I
appreciate that this is a technical argument and one, that I am
sure, will hold little appeal for devotees in the present climate
of intolerance, where some are having to face bigotry on a daily
basis.
In the final analysis, it is the last consideration that should
and, I believe, will prevail with my academic colleagues, many of
whom have dedicated themselves to upholding the values of tolerance,
liberty, and freedom of choice. If there is anything we can do to
ensure that people are not subject to unjust discrimination, I am
certain that we will try to do it. For this reason, I am very grateful
to Massimo Introvigne for initiating the present debate, and I very
much hope that this discussion will have a positive outcome. Before
we make a concerted move, however, we should engage in dialogue
with as many of the people involved as possible, in order to be
convinced that any change is useful, and likely to lead to greater,
rather than lesser, tolerance for all concerned. Furthermore, perhaps
we sociologists should begin to question more closely the values
and assumptions implicit in the ways in which we seek to represent
others.
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