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Thomas Robbins
A wonderful Jules Feiffer cartoon depicts a young boy
and girl growing up being told by parents, teachers, an army sergeant,
politicians and by the media what to think and who to hate. Finally,
the now elderly couple watches a TV documentary that exposes a new
and sinister menace: CULTS AND THE THREAT OF MIND CONTROL!
The implication is that only indoctrination which aims
at inculcating something which threatens, or is contrary to the
institutionalised patterns and values of the culture is labelled
pernicious 'mind control.' Mind control that is built into the perpetuation
of a culture is not seen as problematic. A somewhat similar point
has been made by Thomas Dunn in his provocative paper, 'Religious
Mindopoly' (Dunn, 1983), in which he argues that in terms of producing
closed minds, the most effective mind control transpires when 'two
or more institutions collaborate for the purpose of instilling a
particular ideology . . . The family and the church routinely enter
into covenants designed to ensure the religious conversion of a
family member(s). As such, a 'religious mindopoly,' which uses the
family in the conversion process, is a vastly superior technique
to the most effective form of brainwashing.' But the family, even
if it is unfashionably authoritarian, is sacred; and the 'Christian
school' and evangelical summer camp is becoming less culturally
esoteric and thus appear to be controversial only in terms of occasional
policies of racial discrimination or excessive use of corporal punishment
(plus legal conflicts over certification).
In short, evaluation of the means by which persons are
socialised is rarely independent of evaluation of the goals or aims
of a given program of conditioning, a point acknowledged by Schein
et al. (1961). Seemingly pro-social, or rather 'pro-cultural' conditioning
is generally accepted, even if rather stringent. Conditioning in
pursuit of esoteric or dissident values is more likely to raise
eyebrows. Moreover, inculcation of the values of a small 'cognitive
minority' with a highly sectarian orientation of 'go ye out and
be ye separate' more or less mandates intensive indoctrinational
and ideological supports which will be conspicuous and likely to
elicit a label of brainwashing.
The cultural exclusivity of certain groups whose worldviews
devalue dominant institutions and cultural patterns constitutes,
in our view, a key issue underlying the controversies over 'destructive
cultism' and religious 'mind control.'
Cults and Thought Reform
'Washing a brain,' as Thomas Szasz (1976) has noted, is merely
a metaphor, akin to drawing blood with a 'cutting remark.' On the
other hand, there are surely significant models of 'thought reform'
(Lifton, 1961:85) and 'coercive persuasion' (Schein, 1961) which
have heuristic value in understanding socialisation patterns in
certain groups. Some of these models are relatively broad and highly
sophisticated, and are surely applicable to ISKCON and other contemporary
communal and relatively 'totalistic' movements or 'cults' (Richardson
et al., 1972; Lifton, 1985). In this sense it is not strictly incorrect
to say that ISKCON 'practices thought reform' or 'employs coercive
persuasion' (in terms of Lifton's and Schein's model) although such
a statement oversimplifies a complex situation.
But what does this really mean? Neither Lifton or Schein's
sophisticated models imply that 'persuadees' necessarily lose their
free will although there may be special cases of subcategories of
coercive persuasion or thought reform in which ideological commitment
may be involuntary. Lifton (1961:3) specifically rejects the term
'brainwashing,' because it has misleading connotations of an omnipotent
psychotechnology that gains total control over passive slaves. Schein
(1961) notes that coercive persuasion is somewhat ubiquitous and
can be seen in numerous legitimate contexts including conventional
religious orders, college fraternities, social rehabilitation programmes
and the armed forces. Society thus tends to evaluate coercive persuasion
according to its objectives, that is, it's OK to mould a marine,
but it is sinister to shape a communist or a Moonie. Nevertheless,
basic patterns of thought reform and coercive persuasion are evident
in some socially valued institutions. Ebaugh (1977) identifies some
close parallels between social control processes in a respectable
cloistered religious order and Lifton's model of though reform.
In our view, serious distortions arise when models of
thought and coercive persuasion are used as sticks to beat unpopular
social movements. The basic rhetorical device appears to involve
an equation of thought reform with 'brainwashing.' The latter is
implicitly equated with the lurid and sensational connotations from
which Lifton and Schein attempted to emancipate their models. In
contrast, Lofland and Skonovd (1980, 1983) have recently argued
that Lifton's 'thought reform' concept basically embodies 'ideological
totalism' (a term used frequently by Lifton), which is likely to
be a property of any communal, religious or ideological movement.
They distinguish this from true coercive conversion. The latter,
a rare phenomenon, should be defined, in Lofland and Skonovd's view,
by the criteria adumbrated by Albert Somit in the International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (1968), which are substantially
more restrictive (and thus more difficult to apply to formally voluntary
movements) than the broader models of Lifton and Schein. Weightman
(1983:154-160) makes a similar point.
Parenthetically, Lofland and Skonovd argue that the
controversial 'Moonies,' and possibly to a lesser extent the Krishnas,
have essentially resurrected the traditional 'revivalist' conversion
pattern of manipulated ecstative experiences in a group or crowd
context. This pattern has been central to American religious history,
but it has declined in significance since the early nineteenth century
although it is ubiquitous in conversion processes in many areas
of the world today. Since real revivalism has been, until very recently,
rather scarce in modern America, its reappearance is perceived with
alarm, and it is mistakenly assumed to be a totally new and horrifying
mind controlling monstrosity which turns individuals into robots.
To conclude this section: while relatively broad models
of thought reform and coercive persuasion would clearly fit the
Hare Krishna movement, this is simply not tantamount to saying that
devotees are 'brainwashed' in the sense that they lose free will
and that their ideological and organisational involvement is largely
passive, unmotivated, and involuntary. The stigma of 'brainwashing'
in this sensational 'robotist' sense of the term tends to be applied
when the goals as well as the means of socialisation are disvalued
and the whole thrust of group values is perceived as antisocial
and antithetical to cultural norms.
Socialising Krishna Children
An important paper by Lilliston (1987) indicates that the more
collectivistic and goal- directed pattern of child rearing and education
within the Krishna community does indeed depart from the more individualistic
and 'permissive' model that is currently normatively dominant in
the United States. On the other hand, Lilliston's data appear to
show that negative consequences for the children in terms of creativity,
independence, pathological symptomatology, and coping capacity do
not appear to ensue (see also Ross, 1983a; 1983b).
On the other hand, the Lilliston paper, as well as papers
by Gordon (in press) and Bromley (in press), which attempt to evaluate
and analyse the allegations against Hare Krishna in the realm of
mental health, indicate that in this area the 'anticult' critics
have set the agenda of discourse. Lilliston, Gordon, and Bromley
are all concerned to refute the allegations against 'cults' put
forward by various activist clinicians; nevertheless, their efforts
seem to reinforce the tendency whereby the relevant psychiatric,
mental health, and child rearing issues bearing upon the Hare Krishna
movement are defined by the vehement opponents of the movement.
There are other interesting issues, however, which do
not get ventilated, because they have not become entangled in cult/anticult
polemics. One such possible issue entails the doctrine that the
physical body does not pertain to the essence of being. At the Gurukula
schools (run by Hare Krishna) children who become concerned with
minor pains are told that they are experiencing an illusory identification
with their physical body; that is, once one realises that one is
not 'really' one's physical body, bodily afflictions will be experienced
as less traumatic and pain (or hunger or sexual urge) will seem
less imperative. The thrust of this theodicy seems to manifest a
striking estrangement from the increasing 'holistic' emphasis of
contemporary culture. The current media stress on physical conditioning
and the interrelationship of strength, beauty, personality, and
happiness seems to imply that one's body is integral to one's inner
being and that the state of one's body reflects one's essential
self. The radical soul/ body dualism of Hare Krishna appears to
hark back to earlier American traditions (for example, Puritanism)
in contrast to more recent 'narcissistic' currents.
The Gurukula children are brought up reading largely
stories from Hindu mythology and scripture. By and large, they are
not introduced to much of the material through which the reading
skills of most American children are developed, for example, Mark
Twain, Charles Dickens, Shakespeare, 'Judy's Visit to the Zoo' and
so on.
This system runs contrary to the views of those who
like American Federation of Teachers president Albert Shanker (1985),
believe that 'literacy requires learning the culture' and 'kids
must know Jack Sprat and Emerson.' Shanker cites the paper, 'Cultural
Literacy and the School' by E. D. Hirsch, Jr. (Hirsch, 1985) which
argues that to be acculturated, functionally literate Americans,
children must develop some familiarity with Adam and Eve, Noah and
the flood, David and Goliath, Humpty Dumpty, Cinderella, Pinocchio,
Peter Pan, and other elements of our 'literary and mythic heritage,'
as well as Davy Crockett, Yankee Doodle, Emily Dickinson, Lord Cornwallis,
and so forth. For various reasons, according to Hirsch and Shanker,
contemporary school curricula are deficient in terms of inculcating
the rudiments of cultural unity and tradition. 'It's a mistake to
think that kids cannot be as excited by Daniel Boone or Davy Crockett
or John Brown as much by Bruce Springsteen or Dwight Gooden' (Shanker,
1985).
The Hare Krishnas actually share with Shanker and Hirsch
a firm rejection of the view that reading is essentially a technical
skill such that it does not matter what content or subject matter
is employed to develop reading powers-it is the skill that counts.
Nevertheless, the Hindu exclusivity of Gurukula reading programs
reflects the underlying alienation of the Krishnas from the conventional
American culture-Davy Crockett and Bruce Springsteen. This alienation
is also manifested in the visions, as expressed to the writer, by
some devotees at the emerging New Vrindaban settlement in W. Virginia,
that that community will develop as a refuge and a fortress when
America's 'dying culture' collapses and chaos and violence pervade
the land. (This view is not normative for all of ISKCON; indeed
Swami Bhaktipada of New Vrindaban has just been expelled from the
movement.)
The Krishnas and the 'Moonies,' so different in many
respects, nevertheless, appear to converge with regard to a self-definition
as the exclusive beacon of spirituality in a world pervaded by demonic
forces. 'Today the world is controlled by demons totally devoid
of Krishna consciousness,' notes Swami Bhaktipada. 'In such an atmosphere,
there can be neither peace nor happiness. Until the Lord's devotees
spread Krishna consciousness throughout the world, there will be
no peace' (Bhaktipada, 1984:183).
It is our view that this attitude, which is resented
by many Americans, whose lives and accomplishments are radically
devalued, underlies much of the hostility to 'totalistic' and 'intolerant'
religious 'cults.' The latter naturally appear as threats to basic
values and institutions. As one relatively moderate theorist of
the 'anticult movement'has written, intolerant cults provoke a 'valid
cultural protest' on the part of citizens, which unfortunately sometimes
leads to regrettable persecutory excesses (Langone, 1985). While
avoiding extreme persecution, the law, it has been suggested, might
explore ways to 'incline toward defence of the culture.'
Krishna and Culture
This attitude of radical estrangement form the dominant cultural
milieu is hardly foreign to the history of Christianity. The classic
expression of this outlook was by Tertullian, who asked, 'What has
Jerusalem to do with Athens?' (That is what has our truth in Christ
to do with the doomed and degraded dominant (pagan-Hellenistic)
culture?) Like many Christians of the first and second century,
Tertullian believed that 'whatever does not belong to the commonwealth
of Christ is under the rule of evil . . . so that the plain alternative
was to be either a Christian or a wicked man' (Neibuhr, 1951:50).
Sin, according to Tertullian, resides chiefly in culture. Christ
comes not to civilise 'boors and savages' but 'to enlighten men
already civilised, and under illusions from their very culture,
that they might come to the knowledge of truth' (quoted in Neibuhr,
1951:53, my emphasis). Thus, Tertullian 'has no sympathy with the
efforts of some Christians of his time to point out positive connections
between their faith and the ideas of the Greek philosophers. "Away,"
he exclaims, "with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity
of stoic, platonic and dialectic composition . . . with our faith
we desire no further belief'" ' (Neibuhr, 1951:54).
But his attitude has not remained dominant in Christianity.
More popular in the twentieth century has been the attitude embodied
in Bruce Barton's best-seller, The Man Nobody Knows, which
argued that Christ was an amazingly proficient businessman and corporate
executive. Christ as anti-cultural demiurge has become Christ as
culture hero. In this view, accepted to some extent by Locke, Leibniz,
Kant, Jefferson, and even Christian radicals, Christ works through
culture and within the human community rather than on it from without.
The 'Christ of Culture' 'does not call upon men to leave homes and
kindred for his sake; he enters into their homes and all their associations
as the gracious presence which adds an aura of infinite meaning
to all temporal tasks' (Neibuhr, 1951:93).
The Hare Krishnas presently incline toward the 'anti-cultural'
polarity. However, this may change. If Krishna can drive a chariot,
perhaps he can also drive a truck and sing country music. Nevertheless,
the self-concept of the movement as the exclusive beacon of spirituality
in a degraded and demonic world presently renders the movement somewhat
of an 'uncivil religion' in the sense that there is a violation
of the American 'Religion of Civility' (Cuddihy, 1978)-its fetish
of tolerance, its sacralisation of religious pluralism, and its
fervent, apocalyptic hostility to fervent and apocalyptic messianic
religion (Robbins, 1985).
American culture might thus be said to be 'intolerant
of intolerance.' In this regard, it resembles imperial Roman culture,
which encompassed a great diversity of customs and faiths such that
unity could only be sustained if reverence and respect were granted
to the multifold traditions and rites of constituent elements. Romans
could thus be expected, notes Gibbon, to 'unite with indignation
against any sect of people that should separate itself from the
communion of mankind and disdain every form of worship except its
own as impious and idolatrous.' (Gibbon, 1969: 402)
Over time, American faiths have tended to surrender
their elements of intolerance and exclusivity. This, as John Cuddihy
(1978: 26) notes, is what happened to the major American religious
communities:
In the American setting, and under the steady gaze of the American
'public philosophy' and its civil religion, these traditional
monopolistic pretensions made their own adherents uneasy and embarrassed.
The Roman Catholic claim to uniqueness (the 'One True Church');
the Jewish claim to uniqueness ('the chosen people'); the Protestant
fundamentalist claim to uniqueness ('Jesus only saves')-are variants
of a more general claim: the claim to be religiously superior
or elite. While the traditionalist spokesmen for these religions
. . .[may still ritualistically put forward old totalitarian claims]
. . . few members of their own religions take these claims very
seriously, and, of course, even fewer members of the other religions.
The 'established' situation of pluralism in America makes these
traditional definitions of religious reality sound silly as their
large claims echo across the American heartland; the pervasive
civil religion of America makes them sound heretical.
The pressure of the dominant 'religion of civility,'
which celebrates, indeed sacralises, 'established' denominational
pluralism, pushes religionists toward the assumption of a humble
one-among-many men. The prophet Elijah becomes Uriah Heep. Thus,
apocalyptic visions and claims to an exclusive truth tend to be
gradually mitigated, as Cuddihy has demonstrated, until 'no offence'
is given.
As Gordon (in press) notes, there are certainly signs
of incipient cultural accommodation and mitigation of exclusivity
in ISKCON. But if the intolerance is exorcised from the symbolic
universe of Hare Krishna, what will be left of the latter? Tolerance,
notes G. K. Chesterton, is the virtue of those who believe in nothing.
The contribution of ISKCON lies partly in its claim to uniqueness.
Without these claims and with too humble an acknowledgement that
there are other ways and other truths, Hare Krishna would not be
Hare Krishna.
Postscript
Ultimately, the process of assimilating Hare Krishna is
a two-sided or relational one: the perception of Krishna civility
by the society qua 'audience' is a vital component of the process.
In the 1970s, 'ISKCON was viewed by many people in America as a
threatening movement which sought to exploit the public for financial
gain' (Rochford, 1985:269). In his recent monograph, Hare Krishna
in America, E. Burke Rochford (1985:275) writes:
More than any other single factor, the continuation of the current
public attitude toward the Krishna movement in America threatens
to severely limit its efforts to gain legitimacy, and this would
hinder its prospects form becoming a denomination. . . . Without
gaining some degree of public acceptance, ISKCON cannot hope to
reach the status even of a tolerated adjunct to other religious
institutions in America.
In the 1980s revelations and allegations involving violence
arising in factional struggles within ISKCON and drug profits funnelled
into the operations of certain regional projects (Huber and Gruson,
1987) have impeded the process of cultural assimilation and legitimation
of ISKCON. It is perhaps unfortunate that these allegations have
arisen while the litigation connected with 'brainwashing' conversions
appears to be reaching a crucial stage. The Los Angeles Krishnas
are appealing a $9.5 million civil award for having falsely imprisoned
(via brainwashing) a minor and inflicting emotional distress on
her parents. In the trial much was made of Hare Krishna intolerance
and its alleged use of eschatological threats (For example, apostates
may be reincarnated as worms); moreover, there was dubious clinical
testimony that the basic ritual chanting of Hare Krishna produced
a pathological disassociative trance state. The outlook for the
'normalisation' or civility-assimilation of the movement does not
now seem terribly bright.
Ironically, were it not for current scandals and legal
crises, the outlook for cultural assimilation would look rather
favourable. The dilemma of sectarian assimilation--that mitigation
of doctrinal rigidity and intolerance will alter the fundamental
nature and spiritual integrity of the movement-does not seem insuperable
in the light of the current extension of American religious pluralism.
Televangelists such as Jimmy Swaggert continually proclaim intolerant
formulations in which not only non-Christian faiths but also many
churches are accused of implicitly serving Satan. Although religious
conflict is now growing in the United States, Americans will probably
be compelled to accustom themselves to intolerant sectarian faiths
in their midst challenging the liberal consensus. The adaptations
in the direction of moderation which zealous sects must make (see
Rochford, 1985:269-75 on Hare Krishna efforts to develop a positive
public image) are thus less substantial than might otherwise be
the case.
Unfortunately the present legal problems of the movement
and the tangible transgressions (for example, violence, sale of
contraband) which may have intensified these problems cannot be
automatically assumed to be merely fortuitous consequences of the
personalities of certain regional leaders. The scholarly observer
must inquire whether the interesting mixture of relativism and absolutism
in the ISKCON worldview has contributed to the current crisis by
implying that any means to spread the word (for example, 'stealing
for Krishna'-see Rochford, 1985:198-99) is legitimate and that,
moreover, conventional moral rules are illusory emanations of maya.
The primacy of charismatic authority in the Krishna symbolic universe
has also contributed to volatility and factionalism (Rochford, 1985:221-254)
and has permitted the dangerous eccentricities of youthful regional
leaders to flourish in the post-Prabhupada period. It is possible
that the elements of intolerance, practical absolutism, cosmic relativism,
and need for charismatic authority which are combined in ISKCON
render the movement's stable institutionalisation and evolution
of a modus vivendi with the broader society very difficult, at least
in the absence of a strong but moderate single leader.
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